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Save Ourselves: The Environmental Case That
Changed Louisiana
Oliver A. Houck*
You can drive the interstate from New Orleans to Baton
Rouge, Louisiana in about an hour, or you might take the River
Road. In that same hour’s time you will emerge from cane fields
and chemical plants into the town of Burnside; its stores, a school,
and a row of frame houses. Out across the way is an old slave
quarters converted to a restaurant called The Cabin and run by a
family named Robert. But for the Roberts, you would also be
driving by the largest hazardous waste disposal facility in the state,
perhaps the country. Or, as the Governor claimed, the world.
The Roberts were alarmed by the prospect. With a friend, a
retired nurse, they formed a small group called Save Ourselves.
Because, as they saw it, no one else would. Many years later, after
a journey that seemed several times to leave them dead by the
roadside, the case of Save Ourselves would make Louisiana legal
history and revolutionize environmental decision making in the
state.1 The landscape would never be the same.
Nothing in the Save Ourselves outcome was foreordained. The
odds for winning were slim. The odds of making new law were
beyond imagination. Had this case not occurred, it is doubtful that
another would have come along to replicate it. The Save Ourselves
opinion arose from disparate sources, each of them human, each
operating on its own logic, up to a massive and prolonged
collision.
We could, of course, continue to read and practice law
effectively without knowing anything about Save Ourselves other
than the requirements it left behind and mark its passage. We
would be much the poorer, however, because the story of this case
says so much about Louisiana’s difficult marriage with the notion
of environmental protection and what it takes for this protection,
even today, to work. At bottom it requires people, which is where
this story begins.

Copyright 2012, by OLIVER A. HOUCK.
* Professor of Law, Tulane University. The research assistance of Claire
Yancey, Tulane Law School ’10, and Roman Griffith, ’11, is acknowledged with
gratitude.
1. Save Ourselves v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La.
1984).
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I. THE CALL
It started with a telephone call from Ruby Cointment, an old
friend, who had been reading the morning paper.2 Theresa Robert,
a 26-year-old housewife with a house trailer to keep, a small
restaurant to run, and a three-year-old loose on the floor did not
have time for the paper, but she could tuck the telephone receiver
under her ear and keep on with the dishes. “Honey,” she asked,
“they going to do what?” Ruby said, “they going to build a toxic
waste dump by you, barges coming in off the river and all.” She
paused, reading ahead, and then added, “it’s going to be the biggest
in the world.”3
Ascension Parish lies south of Baton Rouge along the
Mississippi River, its landscape capturing Louisiana’s transition
from a plantation economy to a new one based on oil, gas, and
chemicals. At their peak, columned dwellings in all shapes and
colors lined the river from the capital city to New Orleans, a grand
promenade for the steamboats passing by.4 The Civil War,
however, broke the back of the sugar economy. By the end of the
war, the number of plantations had dropped from 1,400 to less than
200, most of these on the road to decay.5 One hundred years later
the best living examples still standing—Tezcuco, Houmas House,
San Francisco, Nottoway—were found in and around Ascension,
shoulder to shoulder with chemical plants and oil refineries, a new
kind of plantation culture that made the air smell funny from time
to time and left dead fish on the surface of bayou waters. Slowly
and unwillingly, a state deeply dependent on petrochemicals began
recognizing that their byproducts were dangerous and that
dumping them wherever convenient was not a good solution. With
this recognition, however, came a golden prospect.
2. Interview by Claire Yancey, with Theresa Robert, Al Robert, and Al
Robert, Jr. in Burnside, La. (October 23, 2008) [hereinafter Robert Interview].
The quotations that follow are taken from this interview.
3. See Sonny Albarado & Penny Perkins, Waste Unit Set on Site for
Airport, MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 18, 1979, at 1-B
(“Ascension Parish Police Jury President Vincent ‘Cy’ Tortorich Responded
with a shocked ‘What!’ when told Wednesday that property his parish and East
Baton Rouge Parish were considering for an airport location will be used instead
for the world’s largest chemical waste treatment complex.”).
4. The River Road, WWW.NPS.GOV, http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/louisiana/
riverroad.htm. (last visited March 19, 2011).
5. John McQuaid, Transforming the Land, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 21,
2000, http://www.nola.com/speced/unwelcome/index.ssf?/speced/unwelcome/
stories/0521transforming.html; Mary Gehman, Touring Louisiana’s Great River
Road, available at http://margaretmedia.dawesbiz.net/river_road/intro.htm (last
visited April 12, 2011).
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The problem was pressing. U.S. industries in the early 1980s
were generating around 600 billion pounds of hazardous waste
each year—roughly one million pounds per minute.6 The State of
Louisiana, 31st of the states in size, led the nation in hazardous
waste production,7 with over 16,000 pounds for every person in the
state—much of it discharged directly into the river or in open pits
and underground cavities, eventually finding its way into local
wells, swamps and streams. At the time the Save Ourselves lawsuit
was coming on, there were close to 3,000 water discharge permits
for 183 million tons of waste a year in Louisiana, most of it into
the Mississippi River below Baton Rouge, the drinking water
source for nearly 1.5 million people.8 Jefferson Parish estimated
that over 213 million pounds of 50 different toxic chemicals passed
by its water intake pipes each year.9 The contamination of the New
Orleans water supply became so notorious that it prompted passage
of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act.10 Researchers at the time
also noted striking correlations between consumers of Mississippi
water and certain forms of cancer, including rectal cancer, which
they explained by the rectum’s function in the resorption of
water.11 The chemical industry denied any connection.12
6. PAT COSTNER & JOE THORNTON, WE ALL LIVE DOWNSTREAM: THE
MISSISSIPPI RIVER AND THE NATIONAL TOXICS CRISIS, 91 (1989).
7. Id. As of 2008, Louisiana was ranked first in the nation for the quantity
of hazardous waste produced, and 15th in the total number of hazardous waste
producers. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR CIVIL ENGINEERS, Report Card for
America’s Future, Louisiana, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/statepage/louisiana (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
8. See COSTNER & THORNTON, supra note 6, at 91.
9. Id. at 93.
10. JAMES L. AGEE, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING AMERICA'S
DRINKING WATER: OUR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE SAFE DRINKING WATER
ACT (1975), available at http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/topics/sdwa/
07.html. Environmental Protection Agency studies in the 1970s found,
respectively, 46 and 66 toxic and potentially toxic chemicals in New Orleans
and regional water supplies, while another survey found such high risk toxins as
carbon tetrachloride, chloroform, benzene, trichloroethylene and bromoform.
See Oliver Houck, This Side of Heresy: Conditioning Louisiana’s Ten-Year
Industrial Tax Exemption Upon Compliance with Environmental Laws, 61 TUL.
L. REV. 289, 314 (1986) (citing ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT ANALYTIC
REPORT: NEW ORLEANS AS A WATER SUPPLY STUDY (1974) and ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF SUSPECTED CARCINOGENS IN DRINKING
WATER: REPORT TO CONGRESS (1975)).
11. See Houck, supra note 10, at 315–316 (citing GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE
ON ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH IN LOUISIANA: THE
CANCER PROBLEM 165–66 (1984); Cancer Risk Higher From Drinking River
Water, Study Shows, MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Apr. 25, 1985
(Supp.) (Prosperity in Paradise? Louisiana’s Chemical Legacy) at 10, col. 1;
Interview with Dr. Marise Gottlieb, Tulane University (Apr. 2, 1986)).
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Hazardous waste landfill disposal in the state was also
booming, with nearly one-third of the nation’s storage capacity
held in open lagoons, spread onto the land or injected into
underground wells, where it by and large went off the radar.13
Fewer than half of Louisiana’s 3,000 injection wells had ever been
inspected, and the inspections that did occur showed widespread
problems.14 State officials were unable even to “venture a guess” at
the volume of oilfield waste injections, which were but one slice of
the pie.15 To this leviathan one could add nearly 200 chemical
waste pits on private industrial sites, another 20,000 “non
hazardous” oilfield pits, and rampant “midnight” dumping.16 As a
state official in that era observed, “all it took was a backhoe.”17
All of which is to say that Louisiana, its popular governor,
Edwin Edwards, and Ascension Parish had a bona fide problem on
their hands. For the Governor, it was all opportunity. The state
could develop the capacity not only to manage its own wastes but
to provide this service to the nation as well.18 It would be a virtual

12. Industry, Cancer Link Unproved, MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge),
Apr. 25, 1985 (Supp.) (Prosperity in Paradise? Louisiana’s Chemical Legacy)
at 8, col. 1 (quoting Fred Loy, President of the Louisiana Chemical Association,
saying “I’m tired of having to address the issue of cancer and the chemical
industry, when there is no evidence that they are related.”).
13. R.D. Bullard, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, 66 (1990); Jason Berry, The Poisoning of Louisiana, SOUTHERN
EXPOSURE, Mar.–Apr. 1984, at 16–17 (“With 80 waste injection wells,
Louisiana has roughly 25 percent of all such wells in the United States.”).
14. See Houck, supra note 10, at 324 (citing Well Testers Overwhelmed,
MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Apr. 25, 1985 (Supp.) (Prosperity in
Paradise? Louisiana’s Chemical Legacy) at 15 (of approximately 3,000
injection well for wastes of all types, only half had been inspected and, of those,
some thirty percent had problems)).
15. Id. at 325.
16. State Faces Groundwater Problems, MORNING ADVOCATE, Apr. 25,
1985 (Supp.) (Prosperity in Paradise? Louisiana’s Chemical Legacy) at 14, col.
1; Houck, supra note 10, at 326 (citing Loopholes Mask Groundwater Problems,
MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Apr. 25, 1985 (Supp.) (Prosperity in
Paradise? Louisiana’s Chemical Legacy) at 15, col. 1; Judice, Hearing Monday
on Oilfield Waste Rules, TIMES-PICAYUNE/STATES-ITEM, Aug. 3, 1985, at B-1,
col. 2.).
17. Undiscovered Waste Sites Pose Threat to Water, MORNING ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge), Apr. 25, 1985 (Supp.) (Prosperity in Paradise? Louisiana’s
Chemical Legacy) at 19, col. 1. A representative of the Office of Conservation
states: “We know it’s happening because we keep catching people.” Id. (quoting
Carroll Wascom, Office of Conservation).
18. Interview with Edmund (“Judge”) Reggie in New Orleans, La. (August,
1982); Stella Pitts, Waste Plant Opposed by Ascension Group, MORNING
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 18, 1979 (on file with author).
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captive market; waste production was booming and there was no
place for it to go. Louisiana was already importing over 100,000
tons of toxic residuals from other states.19 We simply needed to
corral the parade.
Governor Edwards did nothing by halves. He wanted a national
player to lead this initiative and sent Secretary of Natural
Resources Jim Hutchinson to a waste conference in California,
where he met representatives from the I.T. corporation and they
apparently struck it off at once.20 I.T. had been created a few years
earlier as a waste cleanup operation but had expanded quickly into
several disposal plants in California.21 It had a reputation in the
field. That was good enough for Hutchinson. The Governor had
found his operator.
II. THE COMING STORM
The Roberts were not looking for a fight. They had, in fact, just
finished with a bruising episode in which Theresa’s cousin Shelby
had proposed to sell neighboring property for an Ascension Parish
airport, with the existing Baton Rouge airport only 30 minutes up
the highway.22 Approved by the parish police jury, the proposal
was eventually defeated by a referendum, leaving family and
community scars all along the way.23 Now came this proposal, and
of all things it was cousin Shelby again proposing to sell the same
land for the world’s largest waste dump.24 This was Theresa’s
home, the old slave quarters she and her husband had patiently
restored into a small restaurant, the place she was raising her
children. She saw no choice.
Ruby Cointment, for her part, had been a nurse at the cancer
center M.D. Anderson in Houston for many years and had seen
what she believed to be too many Louisiana children with strange

19. Bullard, supra note 13, at 66
20. Al Robert, Jr., The “IT Decision”, LA. ENVTL. LAWYER, Summer 2004,
at 2 (citing D. Eric Bookhardt, A Magnet for Toxic Wastes, FIGARO
NEWSMAGAZINE, Mar. 17, 1980, at 5–6).
21. Id.
22. Robert Interview, supra note 2.
23. Albarado & Perkins, supra note 3, at 1-B.
24. Interview by Claire Yancey with William Fontenot, former member of
the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office, in Baton Rouge, La. (Sept. 21, 2008)
[hereinafter Fontenot Interview]. Mr. Fontenot worked with the Roberts and
other Louisiana citizens on access to information, law and other services relating
to environmental quality.
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ailments.25 The I.T. proposal brought these children back to mind,
which is why she had called Theresa that morning. Theresa had
two youngsters and a third on the way.
Neither of the women were “environmentalists.”26 Theresa
Robert professed not to have yet heard the word. Further, she had
not even known the plants nearby had hazardous wastes before she
got involved.27 The oil, gas, and chemical industry supported the
little town of Burnside as it did the entire parish. Its workers
constituted most of her customers at The Cabin. Theresa’s father
had worked as a supervisor for the Agrico fertilizer plant across the
river in Donaldsonville, and her husband and his family owned a
fuel distributorship that ran between the Texaco refinery and local
gas stations.28 Ruby’s husband did survey work for plants up and
down the river.29 They were industry people.30 But the I.T.
proposal was different.
Looking around, they discovered that at least eight major
hazardous waste disposal facilities were already in operation along
the river in Ascension Parish, a small rectangle of about ten miles
by thirty.31 Three abandoned chemical dumps in the area had made
the state’s Superfund list for priority cleanup, the most serious of
the known super-problems.32 To Louisiana officials, the Burnside
location was logical—a lightly populated area in obvious need of
hazardous waste disposal. To the Roberts, however, the location
could not be more insensitive. It was within a mile of their town,
and two miles from a predominantly black school with 233
students from kindergarten through eighth grade.33 The facility
would, furthermore, sit on top of a former Houma Indian Nation
village and within a stone’s throw of three registered national
landmarks including the St. Joseph’s School House, one of the first

25. Robert Interview, supra note 2 (“She saw the children from Louisiana . . .
she just always thought there was more children from Louisiana there than other
states, and it really concerned her.”).
26. Id. (“The environmentalists were people that didn’t wash their hair, and
they came in with babies on their backs, and sandals and barefooted.”).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Fontenot Interview, supra note 24.
30. Robert Interview, supra note 2 (“Industry put food on my table; industry
took care of my family.”).
31. Id.
32. COSTNER & THORNTON, supra note 6 at 42.
33. Stella Pitts, Purified wastes, or poison water? Disposal plant fighting
rages on, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 1, 1981, at 1-1 (on file with author) (Noting
that Ascension Parish contains “three of the state’s most serious hazardous
waste disposal sites.”).
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Catholic schools in Louisiana established for people of color.34 The
147-year-old Tezcuco plantation with a dozen small cottages, two
museums, chapel and collection of 200-year-old oak trees was one
of the last remaining crown jewels of its culture.35 The Houmas
House Plantation felt so threatened that it participated actively in
the hearings to come and supported the Roberts in their legal
actions.36 As Theresa Robert, Ruby Cointment and an increasing
number of locals saw it, the I.T. proposal was not a solution; it was
an assault.
National news at the time was not comforting. Grim reports
came from Love Canal in upper New York State, where thousands
of tons of toxins were found beneath a suburban neighborhood,
soon followed by scandals at Woburn, Massachusetts and
Kentucky’s Valley of the Drums.37 An equally dark report came
from Bayou Sorrel on just the other side of the Mississippi, where
a young man named Curly Jackson opened the cock valve on a
tanker full of hydrogen sulfide gas and was killed on the spot.38
The toxins in Jackson’s blood levels reached 3000 parts per
million.39 The Governor and the parish sheriff had claimed that he
probably died of carbon monoxide instead.40 The press had a field
day. Hazardous waste was not looking like a friendly neighbor.
34. Historic school struck from national register, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb.
26, 2011.
35. Dorothy Mahan, People Power: Two Homemakers Win Landmark
Environmental Decision, PRESERVATION IN PRINT, Dec. 1992, at 16; Historic
School Struck From National Register, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011,
http://www.shreveporttimes.com/article/20110227/NEWS01/102270319/Histori
c-school-struck-from-national-register.
36. Stella Pitts, Houmas House neighbor upsets residents, MORNING
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Mar. 1, 1981 (quoting Houmas House owner Edwin
Paul Crozat, who said “Our only hope is in the courts.”) (on file with author);
Sonny Albarado, Dispute almost halts waste permit hearing, MORNING
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), at 1-B (on file with author). The Plantation also
provided funding for key expert witnesses. Interview by Claire Yancey with
Steve Irving in Baton Rouge, La. (November 21, 2008) [hereinafter Irving
Interview].
37. See Sam Howe Verhovek, After 10 Years, the Trauma of Love Canal
Continues, N.Y. TIMES, August 5, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/05/
nyregion/after-10-years-the-trauma-of-love-canal-continues.html;
JONATHAN
HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1996); James Bruggers, Toxic Legacy Revisited: Valley
of the Drums 30 Years Later, COURIER-JOURNAL, December 14, 2008,
http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081214/NEWS
01/81214001/Toxic-legacy-revisited-Valley-Drums-30-years-later.
38. Fontenot interview, supra note 24.
39. Id; see also Rollins Envtl. Services of La., Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police
Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127 (La. 1979) (holding parish ordinance passed in response
to Curly Jackson’s death unconstitutional).
40. Fontenot Interview, supra note 24.

416

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

That said, Theresa and Ruby were, at the time, an army of only
two, and that was not going to suffice. They called a small meeting
of friends. Not that many people could fit into the trailer, but one
who did was Willie Fontenot, a member of the state Attorney
General’s office with the portfolio to help local groups and citizens
understand their rights and the workings of the law.41 Quiet, lowkey, never pretending to be an expert in law or science, Fontenot
had attended community meetings around the state for more than
two decades, advising people how to get the information they
needed, make requests of agencies, approach legislators, find
experts, and speak at public hearings.42 For all the things that
private corporations hire law firms to do, while writing off their
bills as routine business expenditures, Fontenot was the only public
counterpart—a resource for hundreds of Louisianans sitting at
some point in their own kitchens with no financial backing, no
access to lawyers, and facing a project they found overwhelming.
Fontenot sat in the Roberts trailer on that evening, listening to
the rise and fall of the conversation.43 When all had had their say,
he told them that they had the right to find out what was going on
for themselves. They would want to organize themselves, starting
with a name. Theresa and Ruby settled on “Save Ourselves”
because, as they later explained, “if we didn’t, nobody else was
going to.”44 They had no idea how great the odds were against
them doing any such thing.
III. THE STATE STUDY
The state wanted to fast track the I.T. proposal. The quicker the
approval, the less time for querulous outsiders to muddy the
waters. Besides, the federal government, also awakening late to the
phenomenon of widespread hazardous waste, had passed a national
law imposing strict new requirements on treatment and storage
facilities.45 An early state approval could beat the start date for
these new burdens. The Department of Natural Resources asked
for a legislative resolution waiving state bid laws and allowing it to

41. Id.
42. Id. For a fuller description of Mr. Fontenot’s role, see BARBARA L.
ALLEN, UNEASY ALCHEMY: CITIZENS AND EXPERTS IN LOUISIANA’S CHEMICAL
CORRIDOR DISPUTES (2003).
43. Allen, supra note 42, at 38.
44. Robert Interview, supra note 2.
45. Mahan, supra note 35, at 16.
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sole-source contract a waste management feasibility study.46
Unfortunately for I.T., the resolution failed. No matter, it was easy
enough to rig the selection process and, barring the unforeseen,
there was still time to beat the federal timeline.
The study was a Louisiana hayride. I.T., which the Department
had discovered in California, was invited to bid. Although it
submitted the second highest bid in the solicitation,47 won the
award of $385,000, apparently on the recommendation of a
consulting firm called Research Associates of Louisiana, which
was working closely with the Department on hazardous waste
issues.48 Indeed, it was directing them. As a later Ethics
Commission would report, Research Associates was
“fundamentally and comprehensively involved, virtually to the
exclusion of the other Department of Natural Resources staff, in
the development and management of the Department’s fledgling
‘Hazardous Waste Disposal Management Program.’”49 This
presented no particular ethical issues, but then I.T. sub-contracted
with the same firm, Research Associates, to conduct its feasibility
study as well.50 At which point, Research Associates was in the
enviable position of reviewing its own work when it came to the
Department for approval.
The Hayride did not stop there. While the study was under
way, I.T. was negotiating with Shelby Robert for the purchase of
the Burnside tract, and had executed an option to purchase the tract
within a week of presenting its feasibility study to the state.51 Lo
and behold, the feasibility study concluded that a single, megafacility was needed for Ascension Parish and that the Burnside
property was ideal in all characteristics for its location. At this
point, I.T. had, in effect, sole-sourced not only the feasibility study
but also the selection of its own project at its own site.

46. See Sonny Albarado, IT battling Nov. 19 deadline for Permit, MORNING
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 30, 1980 (on file with author); see also
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976).
47. Albarado, supra note 48 (quoting an I.T. official as stating “‘we
anticipated having a permit (from Louisiana) sooner than this . . . It’s quite
important from an economic standpoint.’”). Federal law would not only delay
the project but also likely bring more stringent safety conditions, such as plant
modifications and storage pit liners. Id.
48. Robert, supra note 20, at 3.
49. I.T. Corp. v. Comm’n on Ethics for Public Emps., 453 So. 2d 251, 258
(La. Ct. App. 1st 1984).
50. See I.T. Corp., 453 So. 2d at 252–53.
51. Id. at 258.
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I.T. would eventually purchase the land for $1.45 million.52
Shelby Robert, who reportedly had paid $450,000 for it some years
earlier, apparently realized a million-dollar profit. His attorney,
Vincent Sotile, a close associate of Governor Edwards, was often
reported as, and later convicted of, having his own hand in such
arrangements.53 A few years later, Mr. Sotile went to federal prison
for attempting to bribe a federal judge in another waste
management lawsuit in Morgan City.54 The Hayride continued.
None of these revelations, which would wind their way up to
the Louisiana Ethics Commission and the state Supreme Court,
turned out to be significant obstacles for the I.T.’s Burnside
project. At the time Save Ourselves was forming, these
indiscretions were not even known. As things turned out, however,
the indiscretions played their role.
IV. THE LEARNING CURVE
The first step for Save Ourselves was simply to find out what
was going on. Theresa, Ruby, and a few others began attending
police jury and public meetings on the proposal, which seemed
larger each time: an $85 million dollar facility spread out over
1,000 acres with its own loading dock and road up from the river, a
new form of plantation in itself.55 Feelings of the Ascension Policy
Jury were mixed. Some members feared the parish would be
“transformed into an industrial wasteland for the nation,”56 while
others saw a new mega-facility as a way, given the existing range
of dump sites already at hand, to “kind of clear up our situation.”57
None of them, however, liked having the proposal sprung on them
by surprise, the first of several tactical errors I.T. would make
along the way.58
As for the State and I.T., they viewed public involvement the
same way: an animal best kept at bay. The only two potential
difficulties with the proposal noted in the IT/Research
Associates/DNR feasibility report were “public opposition and
permit delays”.59 “If we give locals a vote,” a DNR environmental
52. I.T. Corp. v. Comm’n on Ethics for Public Emps., 464 So. 2d 284, 287
(La. 1985).
53. See I.T. Corp., 453 So. 2d at 257.
54. Fontenot Interview, supra note 24.
55. See Alan Sayre, Baton Rouge Judge Asks Not to be Censured, TIMESPICAYUNE, Apr. 15, 1995.
56. Pitts, supra note 18.
57. Albarado and Perkins, supra note 3, at 14-B.
58. Pitts, supra note 18.
59. Albarado and Perkins, supra note 3, at 1-B.
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official said, “we’ll never find a place for it.”60 I.T.’s Vice
President labeled the nascent Save Ourselves as “a small, vocal
minority who are simply unwilling to understand what we are
trying to do,” concluding “the people are just going to have to trust
us.”61
The more Save Ourselves looked at I.T.’s operation, the less
trustworthy it seemed. For one thing, it was a moving target; the
company appeared to be making up the project as it went along.
An early description stated that it would dump an estimated
800,000 gallons of treated waste into the river daily, an amount
I.T. assured would pose no threat to the area’s drinking water.62
When local citizens objected that the discharge point was less than
a mile upstream from the intake pipe for some 4,000 parish
residents,63 the treatment focus switched to something called “land
farming,”64 which Al Robert remembers thinking was some form
of agriculture.65 It was not. Rather, it turned out to consist of
spreading the wastes out across the adjacent farmland (explaining
the need for a 1,000-acre site), where it would presumably dry out
and disappear.66 Not surprisingly, people asked what happened
when it rained, because the area was prone to heavy precipitation
and annual floods.67 At this point, land farming, too, dropped out
of the discussion.
Instead, I.T. proposed to bind the hazardous waste in a kind of
cement, which could then be safely buried and forgotten.68 This is
where the corporation made another tactical error. It had been
dealing with a company called Chemfix in Jefferson Parish for this
process, a company apparently well connected with Jefferson
politicians who, in consequence, were naturally inclined to support
the I.T. proposal.69 I.T., however, apparently found a less
expensive process called Surefix, leaving Chemfix out in the cold.
The decision was doubtlessly logical to corporate officials in San
Francisco, but, locally, the loss of Jefferson Parish support left
Ascension, poor sister to its wealthier neighbor, to its own devices
as more and more troubling questions poured in. There were
60. Pitts, supra note 33.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.; Irving Interview, supra note 36.
66. Robert Interview, supra note 2.
67. Irving Interview, supra note 36.
68. Id.
69. Id. The description of the Chemfix process and its connection to
Jefferson Parish Officials that follows is taken from this source.
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suspicions that groundwater under the site connected with the
Mississippi River. There were rumors that I.T. had experienced
problems in California. I.T. then indicated that it would burn at
least some of the waste in an incinerator.70
Facing skepticism, I.T. invited a small delegation, at its own
expense, to visit its California facilities and see for themselves.71
The invitation included Theresa and Al Robert of Save Ourselves,
who agreed to go along but, despite the financial strain, insisted on
paying their own way.72
The trip was a revelation. While Louisiana officials on the
delegation enjoyed meetings with their counterparts and trips to
wineries, the Roberts spent four days at the I.T. San Francisco bay
area facility. They interviewed neighbors, largely poor workers of
Mexican descent, and then the mayor and members of the area air
quality management district, who had rather distinct views. Al
Robert later described the plant as a “big joke.” Its state-of-the-art
technology consisted of the same “land farming” technique
proposed for Burnside, plus an incinerator “no bigger than the one
behind the local Food Mart and buildings recently spray painted
with aluminum paint,” apparently to make them appear modern. Al
decided to rent a car and tour the facility on his own, down
unpaved roads that the tour bus did not attempt, leaving a pregnant
Theresa behind, at the advice of local residents. He discovered
open pits with standing water and ponds overflowing with waste.
The stench was “unbearable.”
The interview with the air management district was no more
encouraging. The facility was “a nightmare,” they said, with pages
of reported violations and lengthy court battles against I.T. Local
news articles revealed that two of the evaporation ponds had been
shut down following a year of odor complaints that resulted in an
administrative hearing and an injunction against dumping any toxic
chemicals.73 A district inspector told Theresa that a waste
70. Id; see also Robert interview, supra note 2 (incineration proposal).
71. Sonny Albarado, Area Group Still Opposes Waste Facility, MORNING
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), June 7, 1980 (on file with author).
72. Robert Interview, supra note 2. The description of the Robert trip that
follows is taken from this source.
73. Albarado, supra note 71; CONTRA COSTA COUNTY HEALTH SERVS.
DEP’T, CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., GBF/PITTSBURG LANDFILL SITE FACT
SHEET #3, at 2 (May 1989) (“In 1971, Industrial Tank (now IT Corporation)
subleased a portion of the site for disposal of liquid industrial waste. Ten ponds
were constructed for this purpose. . . . In 1974, the Central Valley Regional Water
Quality Control Board (CVRWQCB) determined that the site did not satisfy
criteria for establishment of a hazardous waste facility. The Board ordered the
closure of the site for hazardous materials and it was converted to a sanitary
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operation of this type would need a “tremendous amount of
watchdog activity,” and some “real valid enforcement” at the local
level.74 This one California district had 170 air quality employees;
Louisiana had 30 for the entire state.75
Nonetheless, Louisiana and Ascension Parish officials returned
with their minds unchanged. I.T. had experienced some problems,
they agreed, but largely in the past. Save Ourselves was going to
have to raise its concerns to another level, and that would require a
lawyer. At which point the Roberts met Steve Irving, whom they
later characterized as “a gift from God.”76
V. THE PRECEDENT
Jurisprudence is not produced by spontaneous combustion. It is
all about context, and just as human beings are shaped by their
surroundings so are legal decisions, great and small. The Save
Ourselves litigation arose from a series of very difficult lawsuits,
each approaching the same, burgeoning hazardous waste
phenomenon in Louisiana in a different way.
The first case involved an attempt by Iberville Parish, across
the Mississippi River from Ascension, to curtail toxic waste flow
into the community. The police jury began in l975 with an
ordinance prohibiting a local hauler for residential and commercial
customers from disposing of hazardous wastes.77 Three years later,
Rollins Environmental Services bought a deep-well injection
facility from an outfit known as “CLAW” (Clean Land and Water)
along Bayou Sorrell for the disposal of industrial chemicals.78 A
month later, Curly Jackson died at an illegal dump site also
operated by CLAW, at which point Iberville amended its existing
ordinance to ban all toxic waste disposal in the parish.79 The
Louisiana Supreme Court would have none of it, declaring in a
1979 opinion—just as the “world’s largest waste facility” was
announced for Ascension Parish—that a recent state waste
management law had preempted the field and that Louisiana’s
“prominent position” as one of the Nation’s “foremost producers”

landfill (for nonhazardous garbage only).”), http://www.envirostor.dtsc.ca.gov/
regulators/deliverable_documents/9730939567/GBF%20FS%203.pdf.
74. Albarado, supra note 71.
75. Id.
76. Robert Interview, supra note 2.
77. See Rollins Envtl. Servs. of La., Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371
So. 2d 1127, 1129 (La. 1979).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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of toxic wastes “crie[d] out against the prospect” of local
prohibitions.80 Overlooking the Court’s apparent enthusiasm for
the state’s leadership in toxic waste production, the practical effect
of the opinion was to relegate Louisiana parishes to an advisory
role. As the I.T. case came on, Save Ourselves would have to look
beyond the parish authority.
Also in the early l970s, a Petro Processors waste facility came
under fire in East Baton Rouge Parish, just north of Ascension;
large, open pits at the property boundary were leaking onto
neighboring lands that included cattle fields and the formerly
pristine Devil’s Swamp.81 The neighbors, the Ewell family, found
their soils saturated with a suite of chlorinated hydrocarbons: toxic,
bio-accumulative chemicals. They brought a civil case for
restoration of their land, estimated to cost over $170 million.82
Although the source of the contamination was virtually
uncontested, the extent of it was muddied at trial, and the jury
awarded a small fraction of the requested amount, $30,000, barely
covering plaintiff’s costs in bringing the case.83 Although the
award was increased to $200,000 on appeal, no cleanup was
ordered.84 Further attempts to secure it also failed.85 The lesson of
the Petro Processors litigation was that civil actions were unlikely
to remedy a hazardous waste problem once it was discovered.
Citizens at risk of exposure needed to intervene at the front end.
This lesson was brought home in yet another set of cases,
arising again in East Baton Rouge and, coincidentally, against the
same Rollins Environmental Services that had emerged victorious
from the Iberville litigation.86 The waste facility this time was an
active one, and relied on the now familiar practice of “land
farming” and incineration.87 The effects of this operation on a
predominantly black neighborhood were similar to those described
by the Mexican neighbors of I.T.’s facility in California. Mary
McCastle, a 72-year-old grandmother and leader of the Rollins
fight, said:

80. Id. at 1132.
81. Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., Inc., 364 So. 2d 604, 605 (La. Ct. App.
1st 1978).
82. Id. at 608.
83. Id. at 604.
84. Id. at 609.
85. See Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., Inc., 752 So. 2d 151 (La. 2000)
(denial of writs).
86. McCastle v. Rollins Envtl. Servs. of La., Inc., 456 So. 2d 612 (La. 1984).
87. Id. at 615.
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We had no warning Rollins was coming in here. When they
did come in we didn’t know what they were dumping. We
did know that it was making us sick. People used to have
nice gardens and fruit trees. They lived off their gardens
and only had to buy meat. Some of us raised hogs and
chickens. But not after Rollins came in. Our gardens and
animals were dying out. Some days the odors from the
plant would be nearly unbearable. We didn’t know what
was causing it. We later found out that Rollins was burning
hazardous waste.88
McCastle and her neighbors sued as a class action, claiming
similar injuries from a similar cause. The district and appellate
courts accepted the company’s arguments that each injury was
different and presented different medical issues. As a result, the
cases would have to be tried individually.89 In the course of these
proceedings, however, poor and minority neighbors were finding
their voices. Black people were coming to the hearings in busses.90
The Louisiana environmental justice movement was being born.
At this point, three things important to Save Ourselves
occurred. The first was a reversal by the Louisiana Supreme Court
of the McCastle cases, finding that the plaintiffs were in fact
similarly injured, by a single defendant, and that the rest was mere
distraction.91 The author of the opinion was Justice James Dennis.
It was his first environmental decision. His opinion in Save
Ourselves would follow that same year.92 The second occurrence
was the emergence of McCastle’s trial attorney, Steve Irving, who
had already entered the I.T. fray for Theresa Robert and Ruby
Cointment. The third was that Save Ourselves members began to
attend the lengthy and contentious state hearings over Petro
Processors and the Rollins facility, educating themselves and
comparing notes.93 There were poignant moments. At one point,
reading from her diary about dying cattle and dead crawfish ponds,
Catherine Ewell lost her voice and a representative from the
Department of Commerce and Industry got up and poured her a
88. Bullard, supra note 13, at 57.
89. McCastle v. Rollins Envtl. Servs. of La., Inc., 440 So. 2d 812, 815–16
(La. Ct. App. 1st 1983), rev’d, 456 So. 2d 612 (La. 1984).
90. Fontenot Interview, supra note 24.
91. McCastle, 456 So. 2d at 621.
92. By coincidence, the day Irving stood up to argue the I.T. case before the
Louisiana Supreme Court, the (favorable) McCastle opinion was announced.
Irving Interview, supra note 36. To Robert and Cointment, it seemed an omen
from God. Robert Interview, supra note 2.
93. Fontenot Interview, supra note 24.
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glass of water.94 Whether this gesture is better viewed as heartfelt
or tactical, McCastle, Ewell, and Robert et al. were having an
emotional impact and imperceptibly changing the character of the
game.
In the end, the McCastle plaintiffs, ground down by years of
litigation, accepted a settlement offering each of them a few
thousand dollars.95 It was a financial win for the hazardous waste
industry, but at a public price. It also confirmed that civil damage
actions, coming after the fact of the harm, were not going to catch
this train. Save Ourselves was going to have to directly challenge
the state and I.T. permitting process.
VI. THE PLAYING FIELD
Save Ourselves was facing a stacked deck. In l980, as the first
permit hearings came on, Louisiana’s approach to environmental
protection was still a game in motion. More than a dozen federal
environmental laws came into effect in one heady spate between
l970 and l976;96 nearly all legislation since has been in fine tuning
these programs and trying to get buy-ins from the states. State
programs, for their part, have been spotty, some outperforming the
federal government with regularity and others resisting to the wall.
The Pelican State started out somewhere between resistance and
denial. Even when denial shut off free money to remediate
abandoned and leaking hazardous waste sites, for example,
Louisiana refused to propose them for federal cleanup lest they
94. Id.
95. Bullard, supra note 13, at 58.
96. For a partial, but breathtaking, list, see Clean Air Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671g (2006); Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat 2767, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006);
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92516, 86 Stat. 987, 7 U.S.C. § 136–136y (2006); Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2006); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006);
Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Policy Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C. §§
1601–1687 (2006); Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1401–1445 (2006); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4375 (2006); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-523, 88 Stat. 1660, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j(26) (2006); Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2692 (2006).
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tarnish the image of industry in the state.97 At the time that the I.T.
hearings were in progress, an Assistant State Attorney General
wrote that Louisiana’s clean air law was not written to be enforced.
Rather, he said “it was in the interest of Louisiana manufacturers to
create just enough of a state regulatory presence to keep the federal
government out.”98
The State’s stance toward groups like Save Ourselves,
therefore, was not instinctually friendly. It too, however, was in
flux. For much of the 20th century, as oil, gas, and chemical
industries were transforming the landscape, state environmental
responsibilities vested as an afterthought within a few agencies
principally devoted to other missions.99 The Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries monitored water quality, for example,
while, anomalously, an ad hoc-looking Stream Control
Commission set water quality standards.100 Department of Health
officials were asked to maintain the “purity” of air quality by
“balancing” the protection of health with “maximum employment
and the full industrial development of the State.”101 The
Department’s priorities were rather clear. By the mid-1970s, facing
a wave of new national programs, it become apparent that the state
would need to do more.
In l974, Louisiana amended its constitution to include a new
provision declaring that “the air and water, and the healthful,
scenic, historic and esthetic quality of the environment shall be
protected, conserved and replenished,” and directing the legislature
to enact laws to this end.102 A year later the lawmakers created an
Office of Environmental Quality within DNR.103 In l979, as news
of the I.T. proposal was breaking, the legislature replaced the old
97. See Fontenot Interview, supra note 24 (when federal funding was first
available under the “Superfund” program, the state initially declined to identify
potential sites in order to avoid their “stigma”).
98. Bob Anderson, La. Air Pollution Law Said to Be Unenforceable,
SUNDAY ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Nov. 26, 1978, at 7-B, col. 1 (quoting
Richard Troy, La. Assistant Att’y Gen. on Envtl. Matters).
99. See Charles S. McCowan, Jr., The Evolution of Environmental Law in
Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 907, 909 (1992). The description of the evolving
Louisiana regulatory framework is largely taken from this source. By
coincidence, Mr. McCowan represented I.T. throughout the Save Ourselves
proceedings.
100. Id. at 910–11.
101. Id. at 911.
102. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. This article elaborated on a provision of the
1921 Constitution declaring that the “natural resources” of the state were to be
protected and directing the legislature to enact implementing laws. LA. CONST.
art. IV, § 1 (amended 1974).
103. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36:358–59 (Supp. 2011).
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Stream Control Commission with a similar looking and equally
unwieldy creature, the Environmental Control Commission (ECC),
in charge of pollution discharge permits.104 Like its predecessor,
the Commission was governed by the heads of state agencies (e.g.
Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Public Works), all but one of
whom served at the pleasure of the Governor, and each with a
statutory mission that regularly conflicted with environmental
protection. This was the scene when that same year, I.T., by
legerdemain, orchestrated the approval of its own waste
management facility in Burnside, Louisiana, subject only to
discharge permits from the newly-created ECC. As the action
wound forward, the ECC would be abolished and its functions
transferred to yet another new agency, the Department of
Environmental Quality,105 which, as it turned out, would end up
making the final call.
The ECC differed from its predecessor little more than in
name. It was no friend of Save Ourselves, but it was required to
hold hearings, and that was all Steve Irving could ask.
VII. THE PERMIT AND ETHICS HEARINGS
Environmental lawsuits are rarely a one-shot event. They often
begin with administrative hearings that can range from court-like
trials with formal rules and contested testimony to the show-up-atthe-microphone affairs of a city planning board that basically allow
people to blow off steam. In this case, following DNR’s
acceptance of its proposal, I.T. had to run both gauntlets, starting
with a public audience before the new ECC. Time was pressing, as
the new and more stringent requirements of federal law would kick
in within three months.
In July of 1980, the first public hearings were held in
Ascension Parish. More than 500 residents showed up, many
speaking passionately against the project.106 They already suffered
from a disproportionate burden of toxic waste. The company’s
assurance that it would not accept wastes from out of state
appeared to be non-binding, and if made binding by state permit,
unconstitutional as well.107 Local citizens had difficulty
104. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2001–2396 (2000 and Supp. 2011).
105. Act. No. 97, 1983 La. Acts 272.
106. Sonny Albarado, Opponents of Waste Plant Pit Emotions Against Rules,
MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Aug. 1, 1980.
107. At one point, Irving represented that several of his clients would
abandon their opposition to the plant if it would commit to accept only
hazardous waste from sources within the state. Albarado, supra note 36 at 4B;
see also Pitts, supra note 33, at 1-6 (quoting Attorney General William Guste
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understanding the company’s proposal, which kept on changing,
much less its safety assurances.108 One testified that the death of
even one child would be unacceptable.109 Who would be willing to
disagree? As might be expected, they made little impression on the
corporation, which expressed surprise that “the people in Louisiana
don’t trust their state officials,”110 nor on the DNR official in
charge, who, with apparent candor, suggested to the press that
local opposition would have little impact.111 True as that might
have been with respect to the state’s decision, it overlooked the
political impact of that first hearing. Shortly following, the
Ascension Parish Police Jury, which had been a divided but
reluctant backer of the project, withdrew its support.112 Five
hundred people in a small community can make a difference.
A few weeks later the ECC opened its formal, adjudicative
hearing on the I.T. project, and the real show began. Save
Ourselves’s attorney had two objectives.113 The first was to show
that there were serious questions here and that, at the least, DNR
had not done nearly enough to ask or answer them. Knowing that
the cards were stacked against him and that the ECC was
composed of some of the most powerful figures in state
government, the other objective was to provide space for new
information, media attention, inquiries from legislators, criticism
from police jurors, fluctuating market conditions, and other
investment options to slow the train down. Theresa Robert
remained on the phone in her trailer kitchen, the high heels on her
pumps pounding sharp circles into the floor, talking to reporters,
arranging cookie sales, and recruiting new members. Save
Ourselves would grow to several thousand, convinced that the
world’s largest hazardous waste facility at Burnside was a very bad
idea.

that he did not think I.T.’s “letter of intention” would stand up in court, and a
permit with such a limit would in all likelihood violate the Interstate Commerce
Clause of the Constitution).
108. Pitts, supra note 33, at 1-6 (quoting Ruby Cointment, who said “there is
simply no way we can trust them to do what they [I.T. Corporation] have said
they will do.”).
109. See Albarado, supra note 106 (quoting the comments of Mrs. Joyce
Haydel).
110. Pitts, supra note 33 (quoting I.T. Vice President Peter Williamson).
111. Id. (quoting the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Environmental
Affairs Jim Porter who said, “[I]f we give locals a vote, we will never find a
place to build it.”). State officials accused local opponents of the proposal of the
“excessive emotionalism,” adding more fuel to the fire. Id.
112. Robert, supra note 20, at 3.
113. Irving Interview, supra note 36.
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The formal hearings began in September of l980. They would
continue for 18 meetings before the Commission alone, with 150
hours of testimony, over 100 exhibits, and a record that grew into
thousands of pages, for another ten years.114 On one side were the
Commission members, the DNR staff and some of the highest-end
law firms I.T. could retain. On the other side was Steve Irving, in
solo practice, with no ambitious law clerks at his command and no
partners to pick up the slack, already over-committed to the
McCreary case and the Rollins hearings, and with no means of
funding even the filing of pleadings, to say nothing of fees. In
addition to these challenges that would defeat all but the most
committed attorney, Irving faced one more. His clients might be
passionate about their cause, but they had no expertise. The I.T.
issues involved chemistry, engineering, hydrology, geology,
biology, cancer, exposure pathways and risk analysis, each one a
mind-numbing mystery for someone trained, instead, in law. The
permits themselves were so complicated they required training
even to read them, much less to critique them. Irving not only
lacked experts to gainsay the project, he did not even have
assistants who knew what questions to ask. At this point, he
received a gift from God. In fact, he received two of them. They
changed all the dynamics.
As the formal hearings began, Irving was approached by
Bentley Mackie who was an employee of the Police Jury
Association of Louisiana, a lobby for police juries with state and
federal officials.115 Mackie was not only wired to state and local
politics but also to the local hazardous waste industry, particularly
the Chemfix proponents who had lost out with I.T. not long
before.116 According to Irving, there were several local industries
that saw I.T. as a rogue operator, or as unwanted competition, or
both, and were happy to see the project challenged at the ECC.
Mackie, pipelining technical and political expertise into the Save
Ourselves case, became an invaluable asset in understanding the
Chemfix process, the hazards of land farming, and the nature of
subsurface geology that would become a critical, indeed pivotal,
issue. With this knowledge in his corner, Irving was able to turn
the hearings into an open discovery process, asking questions to
which he knew the state had few if any answers, all of which
would take time to explore and resolve.

114. Robert, supra note 20 at 3.
115. Irving Interview, supra note 36; Fontenot Interview, supra note 24.
116. Irving Interview, supra note 36. The description of Mr. Mackie’s
assistance that follows is described by this source.
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This was, of course, I.T.’s greatest fear. It needed to get its
state permits within a matter of weeks before federal law kicked in
and complicated things enormously.117 I.T.’s most outspoken
proponent on the Commission, the Commissioner of Agriculture
Bob Odom, told Save Ourselves, which had just been joined by the
antebellum plantation Houmas House, that he would brook no
delay. “We’re not going to give you two weeks,” he warned the
attorneys.118 Seeing, nonetheless, the process drag forward, I.T.
came up with the idea of an “interim permit,” approving the project
pending further review, which it hoped would satisfy the federal
government that the facility was pre-approved and therefore
exempted from the new federal program.119 Odom made his
motion to the full Commission before Irving had had the
opportunity to present his first witness, which seemed a little rough
even by Louisiana rules.120 The Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries representative took the unusual step of opposing the
motion, explaining that, while he could not put his finger on the
problem, it didn’t seem right.121 The motion lost, four to three.122
Around this time, Irving received a tip from Mackie that Odom
had received a $25,000 “campaign loan,” as yet unpaid, from
Shelby Robert, who was looking forward to a handsome profit
from the sale of his property to I.T.123 It seemed a rather obvious
conflict of interest and Irving lost no time requesting an
investigation by the State Ethics board.124 This created a new
sideshow and more adverse publicity. Odom eventually defeated
the ethics charges,125 but they left an odor that tainted both I.T. and
the ECC. The controversy also galvanized I.T. into acting on its
option agreement with Shelby Roberts, before the ethics
proceedings could question it and perhaps scare him away.126 The
company paid out its $1.45 million and took title to the property.
As Irving saw it, I.T. made the mistake of paying its money before
117. Albarado, supra note 46.
118. Albarado, supra note 36.
119. Albarado, supra note 46.
120. Id.
121. Irving interview, supra note 36.
122. Memorandum of Claire Yancey, “Save Ourselves,” undated, at 32 (on
file with author). The ECC then granted I.T. a “pre-construction permit,” hoping
that it would beat the RCRA deadline. See Roberts, supra note 20, at 13, n.60
(citing Steven Wheeler, I.T. Receives OK to Begin ‘PreConstruction Activity’,
MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), October 30, 1980).
123. See Odom Got Loans From IT Site Owner, MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge), Oct. 2, 1980.
124. Irving Interview, supra note 36.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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the deal was done. Then again, at this early stage of the process,
the deal still looked very much done; it was still only a matter of
going through the motions.
Then came the second act of God, another player from an
unexpected quarter with more game-changing information.127 Dale
Givens was a water quality specialist in DNR’s Office of the
Environment, and later became Secretary of its successor agency,
the Department of Environmental Quality. According to Irving,
Givens was a military, chain-of-command man who did not like
the fact that I.T. and Research Associates had commandeered the
DNR waste management study and the Burnside site approval.
Both from a sense that this was not good government and a more
particularized sense that his department had been hijacked,128
Givens approached Irving in confidence and disclosed first-ever
information on the relationships between I.T., Research
Associates, and DNR. Lacking resources to pursue it, Irving
quickly turned over the information to an investigative reporter of
the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, who had a field day.
As the details came out, Irving moved again for an inquiry by
the State Ethics Board into the timing of I.T.’s property purchase
while it was ostensibly studying the site’s feasibility for DNR. He
also raised the conflicts that Research Associates presented within
DNR itself, responsive to both I.T. and the agency.129 The more
one looked, such coincidences of interest seemed routine. At one
point, the I.T. permit application was supported by the report of a
Louisiana State University geologist that found no problems with
subsurface strata. When it turned out that this geologist was also
working for Research Associates, which was, in turn, reviewing
the permit, he explained he could be perfectly impartial while
evaluating his own work.130 The notion of conflicts seemed
missing from the gene pool.
Irving’s ethics charges here were more serious and more
directly impugning to I.T. than the Odom campaign donation. They
led to administrative hearings and then additional, prolonged
litigation involving I.T., Research Associates, and DNR personnel.
127. Id. The description that follows of the assistance of Mr. Givens, who has
retired from public service, is taken from this interview.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 47–50 (Research Associates
involved “virtually to the exclusion” of DNR staff); Mr. Givens recalls that Ned
Cole, President of Research Associates, even had his own key to the offices and
would come in, unsupervised, on weekends. Telephone Interview with Dale
Givens (April 27, 2011).
129. See I.T. Corp. v. Comm’n on Ethics for Pub. Emps., 453 So. 2d 251 (La.
Ct. App. 1st 1984).
130. Fontenot Interview, supra note 24.
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That case was ultimately decided before the Louisiana Supreme
Court the very year the Save Ourselves case finished its legal
journey before the same justices.131 I.T.’s contentions that it had no
conflict of interest were found “unacceptable to the point of being
ludicrous.”132
The ethics ruling was limited in one key respect, however. The
court decided that, ethics violations notwithstanding, it lacked the
authority to void the contract.133 The Burnside tract, so far as I.T.
was concerned, remained all systems go, which left it with just one
remaining problem: Save Ourselves.
VIII. THE LITIGATION BEGINS
It was always going to come to a lawsuit. Irving knew better
than anyone how prejudiced the ECC was against his client. He
had seen it in the other waste cases, and these were the same
players. His mission was to establish a record from which to appeal
to the courts. In this effort, Irving, again, found two surprising
allies, this time on the Commission itself.
The first was George Fischer from the Department of Health
whose agency had been handling waste issues until the l979
reorganization transferred this authority to DNR and its Office of
Environmental Affairs.134 Fisher, like Dale Givens in DNR, did not
oppose the I.T. permit but he had reservations about the way it
was, in effect, being railroaded. He told the press that he found
Save Ourselves’s concerns “legitimate, primarily because the I.T.
proposal contained so few details.135 “Too much had been left
unexplained,” he went on, “and I just don’t believe the state had
any business giving a permit to a firm which has not explained
thoroughly what it intends to do.”136 Fisher went so far as to move
the Commission to direct an independent study of the matter.137
His motion lost, six votes to one, but each such proposal further
tarnished the project and gained credibility for Save Ourselves.
Irving’s second ally was George Kramer, the Department of
Transportation representative on the ECC, who, being from an
agency heavily engaged in construction across Louisiana, had
131.
1985).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See I.T. Corp. v. Comm’n on Ethics for Pub. Emps., 464 So. 2d 284 (La.
Id. at 257 (quoting findings of the Commission).
See I.T. Corp., 453 So. 2d at 259.
Irving Interview, supra note 36.
Pitts, supra note 33.
Id. at 1-6.
Id.
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access to geologists independent of DNR.138 Together, Irving and
Kramer presented evidence to the Commission that there were
three levels of aquifers below the Burnside site, two of which were
hydraulically connected to the Mississippi River.139 This evidence
was crucial. DNR’s own hazardous waste management plan,
written by Research Associates, required waste sites to be isolated
“by natural or by created barriers” from both subsurface and
surface waters.140 Ironically, I.T. had called this isolation “one of
the most important criteria” in site selection for a hazardous waste
facility.141 When at this ECC hearing Kramer moved for adoption
of his hydraulic connection data as a fact, and additional facts on
subsurface contamination from unknown sources, Irving held his
breath. Perhaps, he later reminisces, in order to “throw us a bone”
the ECC granted the motion.142 At this point, he leaned over to
Theresa Robert and whispered, “that killed the project.”143
Not quite. The Commission voted to approve the permits with
only one dissenting vote, attaching over two hundred findings of
fact virtually all of which supported the project.144 These findings
also, however, contained the Kramer findings about the site
contamination and connection to the River.145 There they would
lie, unperturbed as a buried waste drum until they were exhumed in
court. Meanwhile, there were still three difficult appeals to go.
The first two lost. I.T. successfully argued before the 19th
Judicial District Court146 that Louisiana law prohibited a judge
from overruling an administrative decision unless it contained
“manifest error,”147 a high bar only slightly short of “completely
138. Irving Interview, supra note 36.
139. Id.
140. Robert, supra note 20, at 3.
141. Save Ourselves v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 430 So. 2d 1114, 1119
(La. Ct. App. 1st 1983).
142. Irving Interview, supra note 36.
143. Robert Interview, supra note 2.
144. Robert, supra note 20, at 3, 4.
145. These critical findings included that: “Three aquifers identified as the
water table aquifer, the shallow aquifer and the Gonzales aquifer lie under the
proposed site,” “The shallow aquifer is hydrologically connected to the
Mississippi River,” “The water table aquifer is hydrologically connected to the
Mississippi River,” and “The shallow aquifer and the water table aquifer exhibit
evidence of surface contamination.” Id. at 4 (citing Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La.
Envtl. Control Comm’n, Docket No. 243,970, at 2, 15–17, (La. 19th Jud. Dist.
Ct. 1982)).
146. Id. at 3.
147. The “manifest error” standard derived from paragraph (6) of the
Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act, which authorized reviewing courts to
reverse agency decisions “manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative
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absurd.” The trial judge, obviously troubled by the record, found
that the permit application was unlawfully incomplete but that in a
Catch-22 for Irving, it became complete with evidence he had
supplied during the proceedings.148 The First Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed.149 A concurring judge, despite “misgivings” about
the “dire consequences of error, accident or mismanagement,”
wrote that to cast a negative vote “would constitute a substitution
of my judgment for that of the Commissioners.”150 There was only
one appeal left.
Irving petitioned the Louisiana Supreme Court, whose decision
even to accept the case was a crap shoot. Very few such writs are
granted, and most are dismissed in summary fashion. The Save
Ourselves writ was drawn to focus on what Irving saw to be the
pivotal issue: that the ECC’s approval violated the state’s own plan
requiring isolation from surface and subsurface waters.151 The only
evidence in the record signaled connection instead. Neither Irving
nor any other counsel in the case could have predicted the decision
that followed. The case landed on the desk of a justice who saw a
larger issue.
IX. SAVE OURSELVES V. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL COMMISSION
The Supreme Court justices were troubled by the petition and
held it for an unusual few weeks, trying to decide whether to
accept or dismiss.152 Finally deciding to consider the matter, the lot
for drafting an opinion fell to James Dennis. Justice Dennis had
written related opinions and had also written more widely on the
Louisiana public trust doctrine, under which the state managed
natural resources for the benefit of the people.153 Dennis had been

and substantial evidence on the whole record.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§49:964(G)(6) (2011).
148. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, Docket No.
243,970, at 2 (La. 19th Jud. Dist. Ct. 1982).
149. See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 430 So. 2d
1114 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1983).
150. Id. at 1121 (Ponder, J., concurring).
151. Irving Interview, supra note 65.
152. Interview by Claire Yancey with Judge James L. Dennis in New
Orleans, La. (Mar. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Dennis Interview]. Judge Dennis had
subsequently accepted an appointment to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The background on Justice Dennis that follows is taken from this
interview.
153. See James L. Dennis, Capitant Lecture, 63 LA. L. REV. 1003 (2003);
James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the
Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1 (1994).
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the kind of student who read Great Books of the World in law
school simply to broaden his mind; he was also the kind of judge
who read all the briefs and, often to the consternation of attorneys
before him, did his own research and thinking as well. By
coincidence, Dennis had been a delegate to the l974 state
constitutional convention where he had participated in drafting the
new provision for environmental protection. All of these strands,
the constitutional amendment, the public trust doctrine, and an
independent legal mind, would come to bear on his consideration
of the Save Ourselves appeal.
As would yet another circumstance. Dennis resided near Bayou
Bonfouca in Slidell, Louisiana. An abandoned creosote plant left
the bayou so contaminated that two Coast Guard divers, exploring
the area, came up with second degree burns.154 A follow-up report
by the Army Corps of Engineers found bottom sediments at seven
to eight percent creosote—lethal doses.155 A neighborhood
movement formed to have the creosote removed, and shortly
thereafter, the St. Tammany Parish Policy Jury successfully
petitioned the EPA to list Bonfouca as the thirteenth Superfund site
in Louisiana.156 Dennis kept himself removed from the politics, but
he was quite aware of the controversy.157 Toxic contamination was
a serious problem.
As Dennis read into the record of the Save Ourselves
proceedings, he was struck by the same evidentiary anomalies that
were apparent to the lower courts—the site was connected, and
contaminated—but he also saw state duties here more broadly than
the specifics of its hazardous waste management plan.158 Had he
limited his analysis to the plan, had he overturned the I.T. permit
for failure to follow it, the case would have been temporarily
noteworthy and since forgotten. Instead, he turned to what he knew
best, the constitution and the public trust.
The opinion opens by identifying state public trust obligations
dating back to the 1890s and captured by succeeding
Constitutions.159 Environmental laws for hazardous waste
management and establishing the ECC itself implemented these
obligations to “maintain, protect and enhance a healthful and safe
environment.”160 The result was a “constitutional-statutory”
154. Fontenot Interview, supra note 24.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Dennis Interview, supra note 152.
158. Id.
159. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152,
1154 (La. 1984).
160. Id. at 1155.
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scheme in which the state acted as trustee for all the people.161 The
opinion then turned to the question of how it should do so.
Dennis had little guidance on trustee duties for this new thing
before him—environmental law.162 The briefs did not touch the
subject. He began, then, to educate himself, as was his wont, by
reading texts and seminal federal environmental opinions that had
issued a decade earlier. The most analogous case he found was a
recent decision of the federal appellate court in Washington,
D.C.163 interpreting the nascent National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).164 Dennis concluded that, as in that decision, government
agencies had affirmative obligations to protect the public trust
which went beyond evidence produced by the parties, in order to
assure a proper decision.165 Like NEPA, the Louisiana trust did not
require absolute protection in a given case, but it did require a
rigorous “balancing process” in which agencies had room for “a
responsible exercise of discretion.”166 Unstated, but implied, was
the conclusion that an irresponsible exercise—such as negligence
in examining major permits—was unlawful.167
Applying this principle to the facts, Dennis found that the ECC
failed to do its homework on the most critical issues of the case. It
did not even investigate water wells on the property, much less
close them. It did not explore whether the clay liner intended to
seal off the aquifers below would decompose from the heat of the
toxics. It did not require an additional slurry wall around the pit,
having identified the need for one. It did not limit, or even
calculate, the number of waste pits that would be allowed on the
1000 acre property.168 On the record, it was also impossible to
know what alternative methods, sites or mitigation methods were
examined, nor how the Commission weighed their pros and
cons.169 Under his analysis, Dennis did not have to decide whether
the I.T. project violated the law. The Commission had violated the
law instead.
161. See id. at 1157.
162. Dennis Interview, supra note 152.
163. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U. S. Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Also cited was Scenic Hudson Pres.
Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
164. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370H (2006).
165. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1157.
166. Id.
167. This interpretation was consistent with Louisiana administrative law,
Dennis found, which applied the highest “manifest error” standard to agency
findings of fact, but a lesser “arbitrary” standard for its application of law. Id. at
1159.
168. Id. at 1160–61.
169. Id. at 1161.
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There was no dissent. It was now 1984 and I.T. and the ECC
would have to go back to the drawing board.
X. LINGERING DEMISE
No one knew what to do next. The ECC had no rules for a
remand from the Supreme Court and was uncertain whether even
to take new testimony or not.170 I.T., of course, insisted that all that
was needed were new findings, better addressing the weak spots in
the record, with which courts would then have to concur, because
they involved factual matters within DNR’s expertise. Save
Ourselves, of course, wanted to introduce additional evidence and
to cross examine whatever the government or I.T. proffered; this
was not in its opinion simply a question of faulty language but of
fundamentally serious risks. The state, meanwhile, was under new
management. Edwin Edwards had been elected to replace David
Treen, but that did not necessarily signal the Governor’s support.
Although Edwards had selected I.T., he was also closely allied to
Jefferson Parish and its heavyweight political establishment. His
Secretary of the newly formed DEQ, Patricia Norton, was,
anomalously, an environmentalist.171 Stating that, “to me, it’s a
whole new ball game,”172 she stalled. For two years, the matter
went nowhere.
Finally, in l986, Secretary Norton having been dismissed by
Governor Edwards,173 new hearings were scheduled. But then
came a new complication: the federal waste permit contained
different engineering and documentation from the original
application six years before. Both permits were ordered to be
consolidated, forming an enormous mound of documents, fact and

170. Robert, supra note 20 at 4. The positions of I.T. and Save Ourselves
here described are taken from this source, as well as the Irving Interview, supra
note 36.
171. Norton, presented with the task of new hearings on the I.T. proposal,
told the press, “To the extent that we can, we’re for the environment.” Tim
Talley, ‘New Game’ Expected for I.T. Hearing, MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge), Apr. 22, 1986, at 3B.
172. Id.
173. In 1986, after receiving numerous complaints from neighbors of the
Rollins hazardous waste incinerator in Baton Rouge, Norton made an
unannounced visit to the facility; she found the furnaces at full throttle, the
emissions thick and the control room operator passed out on the floor. She
issued an emergency order for the facility to stop operations. The facility, at the
time, was represented by Camille de Gravelles, who had been Governor
Edward’s law partner. Within days, Norton was dismissed from DEQ. Fontenot
Interview, supra note 24.
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law.174 The DEQ, new leadership notwithstanding, gave notice of
75 deficiencies to be addressed.175 The process was becoming
unmanageable.
Another two years later the hearings finally came forward,
before an administrative law judge who at one point confessed,
“this is a case like no other. I think we’re making jurisprudence
here.”176 It was a messy business. With new witnesses, evidence,
and claims that I.T. intended to sell the site, that the original
permits had expired, and that new conflicts of interest had arisen,
he eventually wound his way to a recommendation to deny the
permit.177
The recommendation went to yet a new and different DEQ. By
this time, Governor Edwards was out of office. Taking the helm at
the Department was a well-known scientist from LSU, Dr. Paul
Templet, who had been strongly endorsed by Louisiana
environmental groups and chosen by the incoming Governor
Roemer from a field of over 200 candidates.178 Templet, reviewing
the record, saw no other option than to deny the permit. There were
many factors for him, including impacts on minorities and the
Houma Nation site, but the dominant one was the hydrological
connection with the Mississippi River.179 “I didn’t think it could be
fixed,” he said. “It wasn’t feasible, and they hadn’t proposed it—it
wasn’t in the permit.”180
At last, I.T. threw in the towel. Templet saw the result from a
regulatory point of view. New and substantial hazardous waste fees
had driven down the waste business by raising the costs of
disposal. “Companies had begun to realize that creating waste is
expensive,” and, with a nudge from the state, were “becoming
more efficient in how they operate.”181 Irving offered a different
reason.182 I.T. had started out in the hazardous waste cleanup
business and only later spread, with chronic difficulty and
controversy, into the waste disposal business. Now, bogged down
in Louisiana by the Burnside waste plant proposal, it rediscovered
174. See Robert, supra note 20, at 4.
175. Id.
176. Tim Talley, Cramer Named IT Hearing Officer, MORNING ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge), Apr. 28, 1989.
177. Robert, supra note 20, at 5; Vicki Ferstel, IT Site Foes Cheered by
Finding, MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Feb. 23, 1989, at 8A.
178. Interview by Claire Yancey with Dr. Paul Templet in Baton Rouge, La.
(January 16, 2009) [hereinafter Templet Interview].
179. Templet Interview, supra note 178.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Irving Interview, supra note 36.
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its roots. In September l982, a freight train derailed near the town
of Livingston, Louisiana, a short drive from Burnside.183 It was a
familiar Louisiana story; the engineer was apparently drunk and
had turned over the engine controls to a female friend.184 More
than 200,000 gallons of toxic wastes poured out onto and into the
ground.185 I.T. was hired to remediate the mess for many millions
of dollars. According to Irving, the lesson was obvious: there was
more money to be made and far less headache in cleanup projects,
which were never far away. Both men may have been right.
At last, Save Ourselves could stand down. From the time Ruby
Cointment had first called Theresa Robert in her trailer, one child
on her hip and another crawling the floor, ten years had passed.
Few days over that period of time went by without some new
development on the issue, a call from the press, or even a threat of
retaliation. At one point, when the hearings were getting heated,
Theresa and Al Robert feared for their lives.186 Things happen in
small rural communities, and this was a community torn between
industry jobs and industry chemicals. Plant workers in the waste
site corridor were told not to eat at The Cabin.187 At another
juncture, playing good cop, I.T. offered to buy 200–300 lunches
from the restaurant as an incentive for the Roberts to back away.188
Neither gambit worked. After an early setback, Theresa rallied the
troops saying, “they’ve led people to believe that they’re here to
stay but they haven’t got a permit yet and they haven’t actually
bought the land.”189 Ruby Cointment later told the press, “big
business and big governments can often intimidate a man with a
job, but they can never intimidate a woman with a child.”190
In retrospect, Theresa Robert gives all the credit to Steve
Irving. He had “an environmental background,” she says, and “a
tremendous understanding of politics; and when you’d look at
something technical, he just had an unbelievable mind. He could
sit there and read it, and just absorb it.”191 Irving, in turn, credits
183. Keitha Nelson and Robb Hays, 25th Anniversary of Livingston Parish Train
Derailment, WAFB.COM, http://www.wafb.com/global/story.asp?s=7144530 (last
visited Sept. 24, 2011).
184. Irving Interview, supra note 36. For a more recent accident of haunting
similarity, see Jen De Gregorio, Tug’s Pilot Jumped Ship to Visit Girlfriend at
Time of Mississippi River Oil Spill, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 22, 2008.
185. Irving Interview, supra note 35.
186. Robert Interview, supra note 2.
187. Id.
188. Fontenot Interview, supra note 24.
189. Albarado, supra note 71.
190. Pitts, supra note 33.
191. Robert Interview, supra note 2.
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Theresa Robert.192 As does Templet: “Without Theresa, there
would have been no I.T. decision. She pulled that group together,
whatever resources she needed to file suit . . . that’s how
democracy is supposed to work.”193
All three may be right.
XI. FALLOUT
The outcome of Save Ourselves, however improbable, is not
the reason why the case had such a seismic impact on the state
bureaucracy, the petrochemical industry, community groups, and
corporate law firms. To be sure, a large hazardous waste disposal
operation that could have become a nation-wide magnet was
canceled, but many things are canceled in life and we continue
with our routines. What the Save Ourselves opinion did was
change the routine.
Following the decision, DEQ Secretary Templet applied its
language in reaching his decision on the I.T. project, but did not
reduce it to a formal process. That step came through a subsequent
challenge to a solid waste permit by a neighboring landowner.194 In
Blackett, a court of appeals interpreted Save Ourselves to require a
five-step inquiry: the avoidance of impacts, a balancing analysis,
and consideration of alternative projects, sites and mitigating
conditions.195 Save Ourselves had announced the principle;
Blackett spelled out the drill. A subsequent waste case went on to
suggest a written basis for these decisions, summarizing the factors
and the reasoning behind the agency’s choice.196 In the following
years, courts expanded the “I.T.” process to virtually all DEQ
actions and the actions of similar agencies including the DNR and
the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.197
Not without controversy. For government functionaries, Save
Ourselves’ requirements were a most unwelcome intrusion of the
judiciary. From industry and development quarters, including
192. Irving Interview, supra note 36.
193. Templet Interview, supra note 178.
194. Blackett v. La. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 506 So. 2d 749 (La. Ct. App. 1st
1987).
195. Id. at 753–54.
196. In re Rubicon, 670 So. 2d 475 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1996) (recommending
formal I.T. findings).
197. See Robert, supra note 20, at n.110 (citing Lake Peigneur Pres. Soc’y v.
Thompson, No. 409,139 (La. 19th Jud. Dist. Ct. 1997), which applied the I.T.
analysis to the DNR’s decisions); Jurisich v. Jenkins, 749 So. 2d 597, 604–05
(La. 1999) (applying the I.T. analysis to decisions by the Department of Wildlife
and Fisheries); see also Robert, supra note 20, at 6 (discussing extension of I.T.
analysis to virtually all DEQ decisions).
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corporate law firms, came a storm of opprobrium: “infamous,”
“overly burdensome,” and the imposition of “extra-legislative
will.”198 What these criticisms overlooked is that Justice Dennis
simply asked the state to justify its decision. Similar plants better
planned and located to minimize risks have since passed the “I.T.
test” with flying colors.199
What the critics also overlooked is that Justice Dennis, in his
decision, actually cut them considerable slack. The hazardous
waste law under which the I.T. permit had been granted, and which
Irving thought were his issue on appeal, required the state to
“assure safe treatment, storage and disposal.”200 The word “assure”
in English dictionaries means more than someone’s opinion; it puts
the burden on the state to prove that risks are minimal. Justice
Dennis, focusing on other law, let this language slip, reducing the
law’s potentially heavy burden of proof to, in effect, a constitutionbased procedural review. The result was an opinion that reached
more widely than the statute at hand, but with a lighter hand.
We may leave these reactions to others, however, because in
l997 state lawmakers bowed to the inevitable (Save Ourselves was,
after all, decided on constitutional grounds) and enacted legislation
requiring an amplified version of I.T. analysis for all DEQ
hazardous waste and (major) pollution discharge permits.201
Applicants would be required to prepare an “environmental review
statement” that covered the I.T. principles, completing a
conversation initiated by Justice Dennis ten years before.202 While
the new law placed responsibility for the statement with the
proponent—rarely a recipe for candor or full-disclosure—it also
specified that agencies were not “relieved” from their “public trust
requirements” under Article 9 of the Constitution. Going forward,
DEQ would remain holding the bag.203 Many states, like the
federal government, now make such reviews the backbone of their
environmental policies.204 Perhaps because the idea is so sensible,
198. For a discussion of these criticisms, see Robert, supra note 21 at 7–10.
199. Compare N. Baton Rouge Envtl. Ass’n v. La. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality,
805 So. 2d 255 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2002) (I.T. compliance approved), with In re
Waste Mgmt. of La., No. 492,277 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct. 2002) (I.T. compliance
rejected).
200. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2192(2).
201. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2018.
202. Id. § 2018(A), (B).
203. Id. § 2018(H). The statement is also to be made available to the public
when submitted, and to be made subject of a public hearing at the request of any
individual. Id. § 2018(C).
204. Fifteen states have enacted legislation requiring environmental reviews
of state and private development proposals. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA
LAW AND LITIGATION §12:1 (2011).
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it has stood the test of time. Who in the world could object to
looking at the impacts of what you are doing before doing it? Who
could object to the public looking, too?205
Government and industry could object when, as is quite
common, they have a deal lined up in advance. They perceive
themselves, with varying degrees of justification, as the experts,
and the real offense of the I.T. requirements is that they give
outsiders the right to question what they know. Worse, if the
answers are not satisfactory, there may come a challenge in
court.206 This ghost does not sortie out of the closet very often.
Few individuals or environmental groups have the resources to
take on the government and private industry; the case at hand took
ten years of people’s lives. Save Ourselves did not usher in a flood
of litigation. It hardly created a trickle.
Nor did the I.T. requirements convert agency personnel and
industry permit applicants to a new, greener way of doing business.
In practice, DEQ and other state agencies have largely reduced the
process to a checklist sloughed onto permit applicants, who, like
Research Associates, Inc., are hardly objective about the impacts
of their own proposals. Louisiana corporations, led by the oil, gas,
and chemical industry, continue to perceive environmental policy
as a nuisance,207 and Louisiana agencies continue to see these
205. Public disclosure has been a tenet of American governance for more
than a century, starting with the corporate income tax in 1909. See Marjorie
Kornhauser, Corporate Regulations and the Origins of the Corporate Income
Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 115–18 (1990) (the tax promoted, and reviled, for its
“publicity function”). The corporate income tax led to the required disclosures
as diverse as Securities and Exchange Commission registration statements and
the Toxic Release Inventory of the Emergency Planning and Right-To-Know
Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–50 (2006). According to industry representatives, the
toxics inventory alone is powerful medicine. See Chemical Industry
Representatives, After The TRI Was Established, WORLD WATCH, Nov/Dec
1995, at 9 (“[TRI] makes us more accountable to the public, and public
accountability has made us smarter businessmen,” John Johnstone, Chemical
Manufacturer’s Ass’n; “Quite frankly, we want to get off that list,” Joe Fallon,
Slater Steels Corp.).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 110, 111. (I.T. and state officials
offended by public intrusion into their decision-making); see also Robert, supra
note 20, at 9, 10 (discussing criticism that “The public exerts too much influence
on DEQ decisions.”). The resistance to outsiders intruding in one’s business is,
of course, human and unavoidable. The proposition, however, that Louisiana
DEQ, because of I.T. or any other requirement, favors the public over industry
would find very few believers.
207. See the repeated attempts by the Louisiana Chemical Association to close
the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, which represents citizens and communities
in the chemical corridor on pollution issues, in Adam Babich, Controversy,
Conflicts, and Law School Clinics, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 469 (2011).
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corporations as their clients. Neighborhood and environmental
groups are still “others” in the equation. We are still Louisiana.
This said, the importance of the I.T. requirements—or any
environmental law requirements for that matter—does not stem
from lawsuits filed to enforce them but, rather, from the fact that
such challenges are possible. It is this possibility, and the
unpredictability of their outcome, that have a magical,
straightening effect. The more one hides unpleasant facts and
bends the law, the more vulnerable to an I.T., insufficientdisclosure challenge a state permit becomes. On the other hand, the
more one reveals about the knowns and unknowns of a dubious
proposal, as the I.T. case itself demonstrates, the more its approval
becomes suspect on the merits and body politic. The American
experience is that disclosure can be powerful therapy.
In the end, the Save Ourselves court did not decide whether I.T.
could build the world’s largest hazardous waste facility on the
Mississippi River at Burnside, Louisiana. It simply allowed
affected Louisiana citizens to put the proposal to the test. At which
point, the project failed. Today, the Burnside tract is occupied by a
modest residential development called Pelican Point. Few pelicans
travel this far up river, but no one is complaining.

